Sec.19 RTI Act more beneficial than Sec.18 to appeal if info denied to person,SC

1.  The appellant No. 2 filed an application under section 6 for obtaining information from the State Information Officer relating to magisterial enquiries initiated by the Government of Manipur from years 1980 to 2006. As the application under section 6 received no response, appellant No. 2 filed a complaint under section 18 before the State Chief Information Commissioner, who directed respondent No. 2 to furnish the information within 15 days. 

2.  The said direction was challenged by the State by filing a writ petition. The Single Judge upheld the order of the Commissioner. On appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court held that under section 18, the Commissioner had no power to direct the respondent No. 2 to furnish the information and further held that such a power had already been conferred under section 19(8) on the basis of an exercise under section 19 only. The Division Bench further came to hold that the direction to furnish information was without jurisdiction and directed the Commissioner to dispose of the complaints in accordance with law.

  On appeal,  Supreme Court held as under:

3.  As its preamble shows the Act was enacted to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority in order to strengthen the core constitutional values of a democratic republic. It is clear that the Parliament enacted the said Act keeping in mind the rights of an informed citizenry in which transparency of information is vital in curbing corruption and making the Government and its instrumentalities accountable. 

4.  The Act is meant to harmonise the conflicting interests of Government to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information with the right of citizens to know the functioning of the governmental process in such way as to preserve the paramountcy of the democratic ideal. 

5.  The preamble would obviously show that the Act is based on the concept of an open society. 

6.  The right to information, which is basically founded on the right to know, is an intrinsic part of the fundamental right to free speech and expression guaranteed under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The said Act was, thus, enacted to consolidate the fundamental right of free speech. 

7.  The exercise of judicial discretion in favour of free speech is not only peculiar to jurisprudence, the same is a part of the jurisprudence in all the countries which are governed by rule of law with an independent judiciary. 

8.  It is, therefore, clear that a society which adopts openness as a value of overarching significance not only permits its citizens a wide range of freedom of expression, it also goes further in actually opening up the deliberative process of the Government itself to the sunlight of public scrutiny. 

9.  Actually the concept of active liberty, which is structured on free speech, means sharing of a nation's sovereign authority among its people. Sovereignty involves the legitimacy of a governmental action and a sharing of sovereign authority suggests intimate correlation between the functioning of the Government and common man's knowledge of such functioning. 

10.  However, while considering the width and sweep of this right as well as its fundamental importance in a democratic republic, this Court is also conscious that such a right is subject to reasonable restrictions under article 19(2) of the Constitution. 

11.  Section 6 in this connection is very crucial. Under section 6 a person, who desires to obtain any information under this Act, shall make a request in writing or through electronic means in English or Hindi or in the official language of the area in which the application is being made, accompanying such fee as may be prescribed. 

12.  Such request may be made to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, or to the Central Assistant Public Information Officer or State Assistant Pubic Information Officer. In making the said request the applicant is not required to give any reason for obtaining the information or any other personal details expecting those which are necessary for contacting him. 

13.  It is quite interesting to note that even though under section 3, right of all citizens, to receive information, is statutorily recognized but section 6 gives the said right to any person. Therefore, section 6, in a sense is wider in its ambit than section 3. 

14.  After such a request for information is made, the primary obligation of consideration of the request is of the public information officer as provided under section 7. Such request has to be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. In any case within 30 days from the date of receipt of the request either the information shall be provided or the same may be rejected for any of the reasons provided under sections 8 and 9.

15.  The proviso to section 7 makes it clear that when it concerns the life or liberty of a person, the information shall be provided within forty-eight hours of the receipt of the request. Sub-section (2) of section 7 makes it clear that if the Central Public Information Officer, as the case may be, fails to give the information, specified in sub-section (1), within a period of 30 days it shall be deemed that such request has been rejected. 

16.  Sub-section (3) of section 7 provides for payment of further fees representing the cost of information to be paid by the person concerned. Sub-section (8) of section 7 is important in connection with the instant case. 

17.  Sections 8 and 9 enumerate the grounds of exemption from disclosure of information and also grounds for rejection of request in respect of some items of information respectively.

18.  The question which falls for decision in this case is the jurisdiction, if any, of the Information Commissioner under section 18 in directing disclosure of information. In the impugned judgment of the Division Bench, the High Court held that the Chief Information Commissioner acted beyond his jurisdiction by passing the impugned decision. 

19.  The Division Bench also held that under section 18 the State Information Commissioner is not empowered to pass a direction to the State Information officer for furnishing the information sought for by the complainant. 

20.  If one looks at section 18 it appears that the powers under section 18 have been categorized under clauses (a) to (f) of section 18(1). Under clauses (a) to (f) of section 18(1) the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, may receive an inquire into complaint of any person who has been refused access to any information requested under this Act [section 18(1)(b )] or has been given incomplete, misleading or false information under the Act [section 18(1)(e )] or has not been given a response to a request for information or access to information within time limits specified under the Act [section 18(1)(c)]. 

21.  The instant case is concerned with the residuary provision under section 18(1)(f). Under section 18(3) the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be, while inquiring into any matter in this section has the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit in respect of certain matters specified in section 18(3)(a ) to (f).

22.  Under section 18(4) which is a non-obstante clause, the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, may examine any record to which the Act applies and which is under the control of the public authority and such records cannot be withheld from it on any ground. 

23.  It has been contended by the respondent that under section 18 the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission has no power to provide access to the information which has been requested for by any person but which has been denied to him. 

24.  The only order which can be passed by the Central Information Commission or the State information Commission, as the case may be, under section 18 is an order of penalty provided under section 20. However, before such order is passed the Commissioner must be satisfied that the conduct of the information Officer was not bona fide. 

25.  Thus there is no error in the impugned judgment of the High Court whereby it has been held that the Commissioner while entertaining a complaint under section 18 has no jurisdiction to pass an order providing for access to the information. 

26.  In the facts of the case, the appellant after having applied for information under section 6 and then not having received any reply thereto, it must be deemed that he has been refused the information. The said situation is covered by section 7. The remedy for such a person who has been refused the information is provided under section 19. A reading of section 19(1) makes it clear. 

27.  A second appeal is also provided under sub-section (3) of section 19. 

28.  Section 19(4) deals with procedure relating to information of a third party. Sections 19(5) and 19(6) are procedural in nature. Under section 19(8) the power of the Information Commission has been specifically mentioned. 

29.  The procedure for hearing the appeals have been framed in exercise of power under clauses (e) and (f ) of sub-section (2) of section 27. They are called the Central Information Commission (Appeal Procedure) Rules, 2005. The procedure of deciding the appeals is laid down in Rule 5 of the said Rules. Therefore, the procedure contemplated under section 18 and section 19 is substantially different.

30.  The nature of the power under section 18 is supervisory in character whereas the procedure under section 19 is an appellate procedure and a person who is aggrieved by refusal in receiving the information which he has sought for can only seek redress in the manner provided in the statute, namely, by following the procedure under section 19. 

31.  This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that section 7 read with section 19 provides a complete statutory mechanism to a person who is aggrieved by refusal to receive information. Such person has to get the information by following aforesaid statutory provisions. The contention of the appellant that information can be accessed through section 18 is contrary to the express provision of section 19. 

32.  It is well known when a procedure is laid down statutorily and there is no challenge to the said statutory procedure the Court should not, in the name of interpretation, lay down a procedure which is contrary to the express statutory provision. 

33.  This Court accepts the argument of the appellant that any other construction would render the provision of section 19(8) totally redundant. It is one of the well known canons of interpretation that no statute should be interpreted in such a manner as to render a part of it redundant or surplusage.

34.  Sections 18 and 19 serve two different purposes and lay down two different purposes and procedures and they provide two different remedies. One cannot be a substitute for the other. 

35.  It may be that sometime in statute words are used by way of abundant caution. The same is not the position here. Here a completely different procedure has been enacted under section 19. If the interpretation advanced by the respondent is accepted in that case section 19 will become unworkable and especially section 19(8) will be rendered a surplusage. Such an interpretation is totally opposed to the fundamental canons of construction. 

36.  It is well-known that the legislature does not waste words or say anything in vain or for no purpose. Thus a construction which leads to redundancy of a portion of the statute cannot be accepted in the absence of compelling reasons. In the instant case there is no compelling reason to accept the construction put forward by the respondents. 

37.  Apart from that the procedure under section 19, when compared to section 18, has several safeguards for protecting the interest of the person who has been refused the information he has sought. Section 19(5), in this connection, may be referred to. Section 195 puts the onus to justify the denial of request on the part of information officer. 

38.  Therefore, it is for the officer to justify the denial. There is no such safeguard in section 18. Apart from that the procedure under section 19 is a time bound one but no limit is prescribed under section 18. So out of the two procedure, between section 18 and section 19, the one under section 19 is more beneficial to a person who has been denied access to information. 

39.  There is another aspect also. The procedure under section 19 is an appellate procedure. A right of appeal is always a creature of statute. A right of appeal is a right of entering a superior forum for invoking its aid and interposition to correct errors of the inferior forum. It is a very valuable right. 

40.  Therefore when the statute confers such a right of appeal that must be exercised by a person who is aggrieved by reason of refusal to be furnished with the information. In that view of the matter this Court does not find any error in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench. In the penultimate paragraph the Division Bench has directed the Information Commissioner, to dispose of the complaints of the respondent No. 2 in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.

41.  This Court, therefore, directs the appellants to file appeals under section 19 in respect of request by them for obtaining information.