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"Supreme Court Grants Leave to Appeal Against High Court's Judgment on Suit Property Ownership Dispute, Multiple Legal Proceedings Examined"

"Supreme Court Grants Leave to Appeal Against High Court's Judgment on Suit Property Ownership Dispute, Multi…

The present appeal is filed against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta dated September 24, 2014. The case involves a writ petition (No. 18500/W of 1985) regarding the ownership of property No. 43, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi. The writ petitioners, who are the grandsons of Kirodimull Lohariwala, claim ownership of the property, while the present appellants are alleged to be the legal heirs of V.N. Vasudeva, who purchased the property in an auction conducted by the Income Tax Department in 1964. There have been various legal proceedings and objections raised regarding the sale of the property, including issues of obtaining leave from the High Court and subsequent orders. The respondents have repeatedly filed litigation over several decades, and the present appeal questions the maintainability of their review petition. The appellants argue that the High Court's order does not meet the basic principles of review jurisdiction. The detailed judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court in 1990 addressed the merits of the case and dismissed the writ petition, but the respondents sought a review of the order. The appellants contend that the respondents have been using litigation to delay the attachment and sale of other properties in Calcutta by the Income Tax Department. After hearing the parties, the Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, in an order dated November 20, 1998, allowed the application filed by respondent nos. 1-3, recalling the order dated October 26, 1990, and restraining the Vasudevas from dealing with the subject property. The matter was directed to be heard on its merits. The present appellants appealed against the order, but the Division Bench of the High Court, in an order dated August 17, 2001, disposed of the appeal without interfering with the order of recalling. The appellants then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed at the motion stage on January 10, 2002. Subsequently, the appellants filed an application (C.A. No. 3557 of 2005) in the disposed writ petition (No. 18500/W of 1985), requesting a restraint on the respondents from proceeding with the advertisement for the sale of the suit property. The Single Judge of the High Court, in an order dated March 31, 2006, held that there was nothing pending before the court and deemed the application not maintainable. The appellants challenged this order, and the appeal was dismissed on October 19, 2012, with liberty granted to the respondents to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action in Delhi. The respondents filed a review application against the judgment, and by the impugned order dated September 24, 2014, the High Court reviewed the order of October 19, 2012, and set aside the order of March 31, 2006, directing the writ petition (No. 18500/W of 1985) to be heard on its own merits. The appellants argue that the review petition filed by the respondents is not maintainable, as it does not meet the principles of review jurisdiction. They also contend that the respondents have been abusing the legal process and launching litigation for more than 50 years, with the purpose of withholding the Income Tax Department from attaching and selling other properties in Calcutta. They argue that the auction sale of the subject property was accepted by the owner, Kirodimull Lohariwala, and the detailed judgment of the Single Judge in 1990 addressed all the issues raised on merits. The appellants assert that the recalling of the order dated October 26, 1990, and the subsequent review process would be an abuse of the legal process and should be curbed. They seek the interference of the Supreme Court in the matter. On the other hand, the respondents argue that the auction of the subject property was never confirmed and highlight the fiduciary relationship between Kirodimull Lohariwala and V.N. Vasudeva. They claim that Vasudeva took advantage of this relationship and avoided paying rent for the property. They also mention a previous court case that criticized Vasudeva's actions. The learned counsel for the appellants argues that the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter and that the respondents should have filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. They contend that the Writ Petition No. 18500(W) of 1985 filed by the respondents did not consider the effect of Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961), which bars filing a suit in any civil court against the income tax authority. They also point out that the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court dated October 26, 1990, which referred the parties to the pending civil suit in Delhi, did not take into account that the civil suit had already been dismissed before the judgment was pronounced. The counsel further argues that the review jurisdiction of the High Court allows for the review of the order and that the High Court, in its review jurisdiction, properly considered the error apparent on the face of the record and allowed the review application, thereby recalling the previous order and setting aside the judgment and order dated March 31, 2006. The Supreme Court examined the principles for entertaining a review application based on the Kamlesh Verma case. They concluded that a review application can be maintained in cases where there is a discovery of new and important matter or evidence, a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. However, it is not maintainable for repetitive arguments, minor mistakes of inconsequential import, or when the same relief sought in the main matter has been negatived. The court found that the review application in this case was maintainable as it addressed an error apparent on the face of the record and the omission of the effect of Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961). They further noted that the High Court had reserved judgment in the writ petition for a significant period of time and ultimately referred the parties to raise their contentions in the pending civil suit, which had already been dismissed. The Supreme Court did not delve into the merits of the case but affirmed that the High Court's decision in exercising its review jurisdiction was justified and required no interference. They directed the High Court to decide the writ petition on its own merits expeditiously. The appeal was dismissed with no costs.



This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta. The case involves a property dispute between the respondents (writ petitioners), who are the grandsons of Kirodimull Lohariwala, and the appellants, who are the alleged legal heirs of V.N. Vasudeva. The subject property, located in New Delhi, was sold in an auction conducted by the Income Tax Department in 1964 to V.N. Vasudeva. The respondents objected to the sale, claiming that no permission was obtained from the High Court of Calcutta. The Income Tax Department filed an application seeking condonation of the omission and leave to complete the sale. The High Court of Calcutta granted permission for the sale in September 1965.



The respondents filed a title suit in 1985 in Delhi, seeking a declaration of ownership and an injunction against the appellants. They also filed a writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the sale to V.N. Vasudeva and seeking to nullify it. The writ petition was dismissed in 1990, with the court directing the parties to raise their contentions in the pending title suit. However, the title suit was subsequently dismissed in 1986 due to non-service of summons.



The respondents then filed an application to recall the order of dismissal and to decide the writ petition on its merits. The High Court, in its review jurisdiction, allowed the application and set aside the previous orders, restoring the writ petition to be heard on its own merits.



The appellants challenged this decision in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered the principles for entertaining a review application and concluded that the High Court's decision to recall the order and hear the writ petition on its merits was justified. They directed the High Court to expedite the proceedings and decide the writ petition.



In summary, the case involves a property dispute over the subject property in Delhi. The respondents challenged the sale to V.N. Vasudeva through a writ petition, which was initially dismissed. The High Court, in its review jurisdiction, set aside the dismissal and allowed the writ petition to be heard on its merits. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and directed the expeditious resolution of the case.



This is a continuation of the previous summary. After the Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta allowed the respondents' application and recalled the order dismissing their writ petition, the appellants filed an appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the appeal without interfering with the order of recall. The appellants then filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed.



Subsequently, the appellants filed a miscellaneous application in the High Court, seeking to restrain the respondents from advertising the subject property for sale. The Single Judge held that there was nothing pending before the court and deemed the application not maintainable. The respondents appealed this decision, and the appeal was dismissed with liberty given to the respondents to file a fresh suit in Delhi. The respondents then filed a review application against the dismissal and the order of the Single Judge. The High Court, in its review jurisdiction, reviewed the orders and directed the writ petition to be heard on its merits.



The appellants argue that the review petition was not maintainable as it did not meet the principles for review jurisdiction. They claim that the High Court's order does not point out any new matter or error on the face of the record that would warrant a review. The appellants also argue that the respondents have been abusing the legal process and engaging in prolonged litigation over the property for over 50 years.



On the other hand, the respondents argue that the auction of the subject property was never confirmed and that V.N. Vasudeva took advantage of his fiduciary relation with Kirodimull Lohariwala, the original owner. They claim that Vasudeva became a tenant of the property and failed to pay rent. The respondents contend that the High Court's decision to review the orders and hear the writ petition on its merits is justified.



In conclusion, the case involves a dispute over the subject property, with the appellants arguing against the maintainability of the review petition and the respondents defending the High Court's decision to review the orders.



This is a continuation of the previous summary. The appellants argue that the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter under Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961), and the respondents should have filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India instead. They also contend that the High Court's previous judgment in Writ Petition No. 18500(W) of 1985 did not take into account the effect of Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961) and the order dated 8th September, 1965, passed by the High Court of Calcutta. They argue that the Single Judge's observation in the judgment, allowing all contentions to be raised in the pending suit in Delhi, was merely an observation and not a finding.



The respondents, on the other hand, argue that the auction of the subject property was never confirmed and that V.N. Vasudeva took advantage of his position. They contend that the review jurisdiction of the High Court was rightly exercised, and the writ petition should be heard on its merits.



It is noted from the material on record that the subject property was sold in certificate proceedings initiated by the Income Tax Department to V.N. Vasudeva in 1964. There was an objection raised by Kirodimull Lohariwala, the original owner, regarding the sale. The Chief Commissioner overruled the objection, and the High Court of Calcutta passed an order in September 1965, granting permission to the Income Tax Department to sell the property. Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961), which bars the filing of civil suits against income tax authorities, seems to have been overlooked by the court in previous judgments.



The High Court, in its review jurisdiction, concluded that there was an error apparent on the face of the record and allowed the review application, setting aside the previous orders and directing the writ petition to be heard on its merits.



In conclusion, the case involves the interpretation of Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961), and whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction in the matter. The High Court's decision to exercise its review jurisdiction and hear the writ petition on its merits is being challenged by the appellants.



In this case, the Supreme Court examines the principles for entertaining a review application based on the Kamlesh Verma case. The Court emphasizes that a review application can be maintained in the following circumstances: (1) discovery of new and important matter or evidence, (2) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (3) any other sufficient reason. The Court also states that a review is not maintainable for repetition of old arguments, minor inconsequential mistakes, or when the same relief sought during the main matter was already denied.



Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court finds that the previous judgment failed to consider the effect of Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961) and the consequential effect of the High Court's order in the civil suit. The Court notes that the Single Judge of the High Court reserved judgment in the writ petition in 1986 and pronounced it in 1990, leaving the parties to raise their contentions in the pending civil suit. However, the civil suit was dismissed before the judgment was pronounced. The Court refrains from delving into the merits of the issues raised in the writ petition but concludes that there is no error in the High Court's exercise of its review jurisdiction.



The Supreme Court dismisses the appeal, stating that the writ petition should be decided by the High Court on its merits after giving priority to the matter and expediting the proceedings.



1. Leave granted.



2. The present appeal is being filed against the impugned

judgment dated 24th September, 2014 passed by the High Court

of Calcutta in RVW No. 272 of 2012 recalling the Order dated 19th

October, 2012 and while setting aside the order dated 31st March,

2006 restoring the Writ Petition No. 18500(W) of 1985 to be

heard on its own merits as expeditiously as possible which is a

subject matter of challenge in appeal before us.



3. The facts that emerge from the multitude and collateral and

exhaustive pleadings of the parties in nutshell are that

respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 (writ petitioners) are the grandsons of

Kirodimull Lohariwala and sons of Premchand Gupta both since

deceased, who constituted a H.U.F. which owned property No.

43, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi(subject property) standing in their

joint names having other properties at Calcutta.




4. The present appellants are alleged to be the legal heirs of

late V. N. Vasudeva who happens to be the income tax

practitioner and lawyer of late Kirodimull Lohariwala had

purchased the subject property in an open auction conducted by

the Income Tax Department on 18th August, 1964 for a

consideration of Rs. 2,60,000/­ and the sale certificate with

respect to the suit property was issued on 1st April, 1965.




5. In August, 1957, late Kirodimull Lohariwala instituted a

Suit No. 1451 of 1957 before the High Court of Calcutta against

Premchand Gupta claiming the said property including other

properties as his self­acquired properties and in the interregnum

period, the official receiver was appointed over the subject

property by the High Court of Calcutta, who took possession of

the property on 1st May, 1958. The said property (43, Prithviraj

Road, New Delhi) was purported to be sold under Certificate

proceedings initiated by Income Tax Department for recovery of

alleged income tax dues of Sambhuram Kirodimull HUF to late

V.N. Vasudeva for a sum of Rs. 2,60,000/­ on 18th August, 1964.




6. At this stage, objection was raised by late Kirodimull

Lohariwala against such purported sale to V.N. Vasudeva for the

reason that no leave was obtained from the High Court of

Calcutta which was although overruled by the Chief

Commissioner, Delhi on 26th February, 1965. At the same time,

application was filed by the Income Tax Department in the said

Suit No. 1451 of 1957 praying for (a) condonation of the omission

to obtain leave of Court before putting the Delhi property for sale

and (b) leave be given to it to complete the said sale of the Delhi

property in favour of V.N. Vasudeva and to give further effect

thereto. A certification of confirmation of sale was issued by the

District Collection Officer, Delhi purporting to confirm the said

purported sale dated 18th August, 1964 in favour of late V.N.

Vasudeva. At this stage, order was passed by the High Court of

Calcutta on the application of Union of India dated 8th

September, 1965 granting liberty to the Income Tax Department

to put the Delhi property for sale by public auction or private

treaty to the best purchaser or purchasers that can be got for the

same. What will be the effect of the later order passed by the

High Court of Calcutta dated 8th September, 1965 in reference to

the order of the District Collection Officer, Delhi for confirmation

of the auction sale will not be advisable for this Court to examine.




7. A detailed correspondence took place between the Income

Tax Department and late Premchand Gupta (father of respondent

nos. 1­3) which is not required to be dilated in the instant

proceedings.




8. At this stage, respondent nos. 1­3 filed Title Suit No. 471 of

1985(Sundar Gupta & Ors. Vs. Sita Vasudeva & Ors.) before the

District Judge at Delhi on 19th May, 1985 for seeking declaration

to continue to be the owners of the suit property and for

injunction restraining the auction purchaser V.N. Vasudeva,

predecessor of the appellants from changing the nature of the

property. Indisputedly, Income tax authorities were not

impleaded as parties to the suit.




9. Respondent nos. 1­3 also filed Writ Petition bearing C.O. No.

18500(W) of 1985 against the Union of India and the present

appellants in the High Court of Calcutta regarding the purported

sale of the Delhi property to late V.N. Vasudeva under auction

dated 18th August, 1964 declaring that the purported sale dated

18th August, 1964 and issuance of the certificate of confirmation

of sale dated 1st April, 1965 in respect of the Delhi property be

declared as null and void and the subject property be remained

under attachment by income tax authorities.




10. Taking assistance of the order of the High Court of Calcutta

dated 8th September, 1965 passed on an application filed by

Union of India of which a reference has been made,

affidavits/counter affidavits were filed by the respective parties

and the writ petition(C.O. No. 18500(W) of 1985) was heard and

judgment was reserved by High Court of Calcutta in March/April,

1986 and after almost four and a half years, the Writ Petition

was dismissed by the Single Judge of the High Court on 26th

October, 1990 dealing with the submissions and arriving to the

conclusion that since the writ petitioners have resorted to

alternative remedy of filing suit in the court of District Judge,

Delhi which although was pending on the date when the

judgment was reserved(Title Suit No. 471 of 1985) keeping all

points raised before the High Court of which a reference has been

left open to be agitated by the parties in the pending Title Suit

No. 471/1985 but the fact is that Title Suit No. 471/1985 which

was pending on the date when the judgment was reserved by the

High Court in March/April, 1986 came to be dismissed under

Order 9 Rule 2 (of Income Tax Rules, 1962) Code of Civil Procedure due to non­serving upon

the main defendants vide order dated 3rd October, 1986 and

either of the party has not brought this fact to the notice of the

Court about the later developments of which reference has been

made. Immediately thereafter, respondent nos. 1­3 filed an

application for recalling/setting aside the order dated 26th

October, 1990 and for deciding the writ petition on merits.




11. After hearing the parties, Single Judge of the High Court of

Calcutta under its order dated 20th November, 1998 allowed the

application filed by respondent nos. 1­3 and recalled the Order

dated 26th October, 1990 by restraining Vasudevas from dealing

with the subject property with the direction to hear the matter on

merits.




12. The present appellants preferred appeal against the Order

dated 20th November, 1998. The Division Bench of the High

Court of Calcutta in M.A.T. No. 87 of 1999 disposed of the appeal

under its Order dated 17th August, 2001 without interfering with

the order of recalling on review application dated 20th November,

1998 but as it reflects from the record, the present appellants

after taking note of the Order dated 17th August, 2001 considered

appropriate to prefer SLP(C ) No. 22491 of 2001 before this Court

which came to be dismissed at the motion stage on 10th January,

2002.




13. The present appellants thereafter filed application being

C.A. No. 3557 of 2005 in the disposed of Writ Petition No.

18500(W) of 1985 inter alia praying that the respondents be

restrained from proceeding with any advertisement for sale of suit

property as no such liberty has been given by the Court. Single

Judge of the High Court, after hearing the parties, held that there

was nothing pending before the Court and thus the aforesaid

miscellaneous application was held to be not maintainable under

its Order dated 31st March, 2006.



14. The Order dated 31st March, 2006 passed by the Single

Judge of the High Court came to be assailed by the respondents

in appeal that came to be dismissed vide Order dated 19th

October 2012 with liberty to the respondents to file a fresh suit

on the self­same cause of action in Delhi, if so advised. The

respondents preferred Review Application being RVW No.

272/2012 against the impugned judgment dated 19th October,

2012 and also the Order dated 31st March, 2006. By the

impugned order dated 24th September, 2014, the Order dated 19th

October, 2012 was reviewed and in consequence, the order dated

31st March, 2006 was set aside and directed the Writ Petition No.

18500(W) of 1985 to be heard on its own merits which is a

subject matter of challenge at the instance of the appellants in

the instant appeal.




15. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the

appellants with his usual vehemence submits that the present

review petition filed by the respondents was not maintainable as

none of the grounds which have been taken note of meets the

principles of review jurisdiction of the Court as envisaged under

Order 47 Rule 1 (of Income Tax Rules, 1962) Code of Civil Procedure which entails the basic

principles for entertaining the review petition and this Court in

Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati and Others has laid down the

principles where review can be said to be maintainable.




16. Learned counsel submits that in the instant case,

respondents have failed to canvass the principles for

maintainability of a review application and the Order passed by

the High Court under its review jurisdiction impugned dated 24th

September, 2014 primarily does not satisfy the basic principles of

law regarding maintainability of the review application and even

in the impugned judgment, neither the High Court has been able

to decipher new and important matter from the evidence which,

after the exercise of due diligence, was not in the knowledge of

the review petitioner nor pointed out any mistake or error

apparent on the face of record or suggested any other sufficient

reason calling for review. In the given circumstances, the very

order impugned dated 24th September, 2014 passed by the High

Court of Calcutta is not sustainable in law and deserves

interference by this Court.




17. Learned counsel further submits that the respondent nos.

1­3 in fact are repeatedly abusing the legal process and

launching litigation in regard to the subject property for more

than 50 years and their real purpose of filing Writ Petition No.

18500(W) of 1985 was to withhold the Income Tax Department

from attaching and selling other properties in Calcutta. It is only

by alleging that the suit property in Delhi was legally headed by

the Department and the suit property be put into sale afresh.

However, the fact is that the auction sale of suit property was

accepted by the owner of the said property Kirodimull Lohariwala

which is evident from a reply which he filed to an application in

the suit for eviction against the predecessor in interest of the

appellants and was taken note by the Single Judge in its Order

dated 26th October, 1990.




18. Learned counsel further submits that detailed judgment of

the Single Judge of the High Court dated 26th October, 1990 has

dealt with the several grounds raised on merits and merely

because the Judge has finally granted liberty to the respondents

in raising all questions in the first instance in the pending suit in

Delhi(Suit No. 471 of 1985) which was indeed pending on the

date when the judgment was reserved and was dismissed much

before the pronouncement of the judgment dated 26th October

1990 but the Single Judge of the High Court has dealt with all

the issues and repelled the same in its judgment dated 26th

October, 1990.




19. In the given circumstances, learned counsel submits that

recalling of the order dated 26th October, 1990 under review

jurisdiction of the High Court and relegating the parties to square

one would be nothing but abuse of the legal process and needs to

be curbed and that is the reason for which the appellants have

approached this Court by filing an appeal despite the public

auction held by the Income Tax Department in the year 1964 in

favour of the predecessor in interest, V.A. Vasudeva and after the

purported sale stands confirmed overruling the objections of the

original owner of the property dated 26th February 1965 and

issuance of certificate of confirmation of sale dated 1st April,

1965, still they are unable to get fruits of the subject property in

question and relegating them to the year 1985 that too after more

than 34 years of the property put to auction would not be in the

interest of justice and that needs to be interfered by this Court.




20. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the respondents,

Mr. Jaideep Gupta and Mr. Siddharth Luthra and Mr. Ashok

Gupta, respondent in person, on the other hand, while

supporting the judgment impugned dated 24th September, 2014

submits that auction of the subject property in question was

never confirmed and submits that in February 1957 Kirodimull

Lohariwala (grandfather of the respondents) appointed V.N.

Vasudeva, an income tax practioner(father of appellant nos. 1 &

2) as his income tax lawyer and constituted attorney. V.N.

Vasudeva took full advantage of his fiduciary relation and

became tenant of the subject property on a paltry sum of Rs.

300/­ per month. On May 1, 1958, Official Receiver was

appointed in Suit No. 1451 of 1957 by High Court of Calcutta

inter alia includes Delhi property. Since V.N. Vasudeva did not

pay rent of the Delhi property and set up a fictitious agreement

between himself & Kirodimull Lohariwala for adjustment of rents

against his professional fees, this Court castigated V.N. Vasudeva

in V.N. Vasudeva Vs. Kirodimal arising out of the eviction

proceeding holding that V.N. Vasudeva avoided payment of the

monthly rent of Rs. 300/­ to the Income Tax Officer(as Delhi

property was under attachment of Income Tax Department).




21. Learned counsel further submits that Civil Court does not

have any jurisdiction to deal with such matters in view of Section

293 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the only remedy available to

the respondents is to file a writ petition under Article 226 of

Constitution of India.




22. Learned counsel further submits that the Writ Petition No.

18500(W) of 1985 filed at the instance of the respondents indeed

came to be decided on 26th October, 1990 but has not taken note

of the effect of Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961) and the

consequential effect of the order dated 8th September, 1965

passed by the High Court of Calcutta of which a reference has

been made and also the fact that judgment remain pending for

almost four and half years and prior thereto, the Title Suit No.

471 of 1985 was dismissed and in the given circumstances, the

conclusion arrived at by the Single Judge that all contentions are

available to be raised in the pending suit (in Delhi) in sequel

thereof was a mere observation and could not be said to be a

finding recorded on the subject matter and this what has been

projected by the High Court in relegating the parties to appear

before the Single Judge of the High Court and addressed in Writ

Petition No. 18500(W) of 1985 on merits and that cannot be

termed to be beyond its review jurisdiction as envisaged under

the law.




23. Learned counsel submits that if the Writ Petition No.

18500(W) of 1985 filed at the instance of the respondents is not

heard on merits, they will remain remediless as their contentions

have not yet been decided by any Court of competent jurisdiction

and further submits that no prejudice either way has been

caused to the parties as they are being relegated back to address

on merits in the Writ Petition No. 18500(W) of 1985, having all

contentions to be raised in the proceedings.




24. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with

their assistance perused the material available on record.



25. From the material on record, it manifests that the subject

property (43, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi) was purported to be

sold in the certificate proceedings initiated by Income Tax

Department for recovery of income tax dues of Sambhuram

Kirodimull HUF to the auction purchaser late V.N. Vasudeva for a

sum of Rs. 2,60,000/­ on August 18, 1964. Kirodimull objected

against such purported sale to V.N. Vasudeva because no leave

was obtained from the High Court of Calcutta which was

overruled by the Chief Commissioner, Delhi and confirmed the

purported sale in favour of V.N. Vasudeva vide Order dated 26th

February, 1965. At this stage, application was filed by the

Income Tax Department in Suit No. 1451 of 1957 praying for (a)

condonation of the omission to obtain leave of Court before

putting the Delhi property for sale and (b) leave be given to it to

complete the said sale of the Delhi property in favour of V.N.

Vasudeva and to give further effect thereto. On an application

filed by Income Tax Department, the Single Judge of the High

Court of Calcutta in its Order dated 8th September, 1965 taking

note of the rival contention of the parties observed as follows:­



“A.N. Ray (In Chambers)


Kirodimull Bhiwaniwala, also know as Kirodimull

Lohariwala resident at Sadar Bazar, Raigarh in the

State of Madhya Pradesh, outside the jurisdication of

this court.



1. Premchand Gupta residing at 181­A,

Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta within the said

jurisdiction.



2. Pawan Gupta



3. Sunder Gupta the last two being minors under the age of 18 years

residing at 181 A, Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta with

the said jurisdiction.



4. Smt. Asrafi Devi alias Sm. Surfi Devi residing at

Sadar Bazar, Raigarh, in the State of Madhya Pradesh

outside the said jurisdiction.



Upon reading on the part of the Union of India through

its Income Tax Officer, Raigarh Civils, Raigarh

(hereinafter referred to as the said applicant union), a

Mastered Summons bearing date the third day of

March last and an affidavit of Sanat Kumar Mukherjee

of the due service thereof affirmed on the fifth day of

April last and a petition of the said applicant and an

affidavit of Ramdas Rambhorose Misra in verification

thereof affirmed on the fifteenth day of March last and

the exhibits annexed to the said petition and marked

respectively A,B,C and D and an affidavit of Ramdas

Rambhorose Misra of Raigarh affirmed on the

Seventeenth day of June last all filled this day and

upon reading on the part the of the defendants an

affidavit of Premchand Gupta affirmed on the fifth day

of May last and filed this day and upon hearing Mr. D.

Gupta advocate for the said applicant Union and Mr.

D.C. Basu advocate for the defendants (the plaintiffs

nor appearing either in person or by advocate, or

attorney).



It is ordered that the said applicant Union be at

liberty to put up the Delhi property being the joint

moveable and immoveable properties including

Premises No.43, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi, for sale

either by public auction or by private treaty to the best

purchaser or purchasers that can be got for the same.

Witness, Sri Himanshu Kumar Bose, Chief Justice

at Calcutta aforesaid the eighth day of September, one

thousand nine hundred and sixty five.



S.K. Mandal – Attorney


Sutt & Sen – Attorneys




S.B. Banerjee 20.1.1966 For Registrar




26. That apart, Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961) put a

complete bar of filing suit in any civil court against the

revenue/income tax authority and the mandate of law remain

unnoticed when the order came to be passed by the Single Judge

of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 18500(W) of 1985 decided

on 26th October, 1990 while relegating the parties to address in

the alleged pending Civil Suit No. 471 of 1985 before the District

Judge at Delhi although it was dismissed much prior to the

pronouncement of the Judgment dated 26th October, 1990. Even

in the LPA, the Division Bench of the High Court granted liberty

to the respondents to file a fresh civil suit in respect of the

subject property in Delhi and either party has not brought to the

notice of the Court the mandate of law as envisaged under

Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961) that the civil suit

against the Income tax Department is not maintainable under the

law, which appears to be mistakenly omitted by the Court in

arriving at the rival claims of the parties.




27. It was taken note of by the High Court in its review

jurisdiction and arrived to the conclusion that there appears to

be an error apparent on the face of record and consequently

allowed the application for review, recalled the Order dated 19th

October, 2012 and set aside the Judgment and Order dated 31st

March, 2006 passed in miscellaneous application and for

restoration of Writ Petition No. 18500(W) of 1985 to be heard on

its own merits under the impugned judgment dated 24th

September, 2014.




28. The basic principles in which the review application could

be entertained have been eloquently examined by this Court in

Kamlesh Verma (supra) wherein this Court held as under:­



“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of

review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:



20.1. When the review will be maintainable:




(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,

after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge

of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;



(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;



(iii) Any other sufficient reason.



The words “any other sufficient reason” have been

interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 and

approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios

Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954

SC 526 to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least

analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles

have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese

& Iron Ores Ltd. (2013) 8 SCC 337.



20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:



(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to

reopen concluded adjudications.



(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.



(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original

hearing of the case.



(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,

manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness

or results in miscarriage of justice.



(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby

an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only

for patent error.



(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot

be a ground for review.



(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not

be an error which has to be fished out and searched.



(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the

domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be

advanced in the review petition.



(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought

at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”




29. Taking note of the exposition of the above principles let us

consider the facts on record and it reveals that the effect of

Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961) has been mistakenly omitted

under the judgment in review and that apart, the consequential

effect of the order of the High Court on an application filed by the

Union of India in Civil Suit No. 1451 of 1957 dated 8th

September, 1965 was open to be examined in the writ

proceedings and it was the defence of the Income Tax

Department in the reply to the review application and also before

this Court in their counter affidavit that in the auction sale which

was held in the month of August, 1964, the permission from the

Court was not obtained and after the order came to be passed on

their application by the Single Judge of the High Court in Suit

No. 1451 of 1957 dated 8th September, 1965, it will certainly

affect the auction sale held by the Income Tax Department in

reference to the subject property in question and it was their

stand throughout in the proceedings.




30. We find that the Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta

heard and reserved the judgment in Writ Petition No. 18500(W) of

1985 in March/April 1986 and after nearly four and half years,

the judgment pronounced on 26th October, 1990 relegating the

parties to raise all the contentions to their defence in the pending

civil suit before the District Judge, Delhi itself indicates that the

Single Judge was not inclined to express its opinion on merits

obviously for the reason that if the finding was recorded, it would

have prejudiced the rights of the parties to the litigation to be

examined in the alleged pending civil suit in the District Court,

Delhi which although was dismissed on 3rd October, 1986 much

before the pronouncement of the judgment dated 26th October,

1990 by the Single Judge of the High Court.




31. In the given facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to

dilate the issues on merits raised in the Writ Petition No.

18500(w) of 1985 filed at the instance of the respondents before

the High Court of Calcutta, but if the civil suit was not

maintainable as alleged in view of Section 293 (of Income Tax Act, 1961) and this was the purported defence of the respondents and of

the Income Tax Department and consequential effect to the Order

21 dated 8th September, 1965 of which a reference has been made by

us, no party could be left remediless and whatever the grievance

the party has raised before the Court of law, has to be examined

on its own merits. In our considered view, there appears no

error being committed by the High Court in passing the

impugned judgment dated 24th September, 2014 in exercise of its

review jurisdiction and that needs no interference by this Court.




32. We make it clear that what has been observed by us is only

for the purpose of disposal of the present appeal and the Writ

Petition No. 18500(w) of 1985 be decided by the High Court of

Calcutta on its own merits, after hearing the parties, in

accordance with law. Since the dispute is pending for sufficiently

long time, we expect that the High Court will give priority to the

matter and decide the writ petition expeditiously as possible.




33. The appeal is having no merit and is accordingly dismissed

with the observations supra. No costs.



34. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.






(A.M. KHANWILKAR)





(AJAY RASTOGI)




NEW DELHI


July 02, 2019